The Victorian Nurses' Strike was a strike in Melbourne, Australia in 1986 by nurses who protested funding cuts and a government that ignored their needs.
Background
Hospital waiting lists had reached 27,000 people and the state government (then run by the Labour Party) decided to cut the health budget significantly. The nurses' union had attempted to meet and negotiate with the government, and it got them nowhere, and even then the union demanded less than what the nurses wanted. Inspired by previous efforts by nurses (such as those storming the Victorian parliament in 1975 over pay disputes, and various strikes across NSW to stop hospitals from closing).
Events
The strike begins Trying to work within the system finally came to an end when 5,000 nurses thronged to a 31 October stop-work, overwhelmingly endorsing a rank and file motion to go out indefinitely. Critical care units were still staffed and all wards had skeleton staff.
The next day, 1 November, most metropolitan hospitals were picketed although, for the first days, no goods were stopped. On the picket lines nurses met many well-wishers. Encouragement to ‘toot in support’ resulted in continuous honking of car horns outside hospitals. Food, firewood and money poured in, and letters and telegrams backing the RANF overloaded Australia Post’s deliveries to RANF headquarters in St Kilda.
The strike itself, while not completely in the hands of the rank and file, was often effectively run by the militants. When the people taking the action are the ones planning strike tactics, it strengthens their resolve. The strike committee met daily at the RANF offices to work out tactics and go over experiences. To ensure the members and other workers got the facts regularly, the union ran a program on community radio station 3CR and put out a daily strike bulletin. To maintain morale and solidarity, the strikers held regular picket line barbecues and sporting competitions, as well as fundraisers and an occasional champagne breakfast. Groups of nurses toured the country regions every day, building support and keeping country members informed.
The government refused to budge for weeks. Cain threatened the union with everything from manslaughter charges to deregistration and the Essential Services Act - threats which couldn’t be lightly disregarded, as his government had joined in moves to deregister and destroy the militant Builders Labourers Federation.
As the government wouldn’t negotiate, nurses started to escalate the action. Pickets began to stop non-essential supplies to the wards, and were backed by Transport Workers’ Union drivers. Cain responded by announcing that police would be used to break the pickets.
While relations between the RANF and HEF at some hospitals were good, with strong rank and file support, the HEF leadership publicly sided with the government. Secretary Les Butler instructed his members to cross picket lines. At hospitals like the Royal Melbourne most of the members did, but at Prince Henry’s, Queen Victoria and Western General, among others, they refused. HEF meetings at Prince Henry’s agreed not to touch any goods brought in by scabs, and threatened a total walkout if police intervened.
The Trades Hall Council leadership played as despicable a role as the HEF officials. Secretary Peter March began by claiming he didn’t want to take responsibility for assisting the strike because it affected the health industry. That didn’t stop him from trying the very next day to force the RANF to hand over the dispute to Trades Hall.
By 19 November, forty hospitals were hit by the strike and building unions were threatening to impose bans. The IRC finally backed down from its refusal to arbitrate while the nurses were still out, and called private talks with all parties on 21 November. It was to no avail.
On 8 December, the RANF again escalated the action. Nurses began walking out of critical care wards. But even by this stage, 50% of hospital beds were still available, mostly through the private hospital system. And it was here that an important weakness emerged in the union’s industrial campaign.
Fresh from the daily picket line reps’ meeting, the member at PANCH announced the walkout. But when asked what nurses were going to do if the government didn’t respond, she replied, ‘Not work? It has to work.’ Having played their trump card, they had no strategy to continue building the strike if it failed.
And the government did refuse to negotiate, even after nurses left critical care wards. In fact, three days later, White escalated the dispute by announcing the government would instruct State Enrolled Nurses (SENs) to do the nurses work. The necessary legislation would be rushed through parliament. In this the leaderships of the Australian Medical Association and the HEF assisted him. Les Butler of the HEF said he had no objection to his members doing work usually carried out by RANF members.
However, this time the government had finally overstepped the mark. The RANF called national meetings to plan action over the use of SENs, with support likely from the more militant New South Wales and Queensland associations. Butler would probably also have been faced with widespread refusal by SENs to scab, led by hospitals like Prince Henry’s. Queen Victoria HEF members had already openly refused to obey union directives on the picket line, and there was flak from the union’s interstate branches. In the ACT, for example, the HEF had joined forces with the RANF over staffing and wage demands, and had publicly supported the Victorian RANF from the beginning. An important, but little-publicised factor was that SENs, in a reversal of previous trends, had begun to leave the HEF and join the RANF. They were actually out on strike themselves.
While the Cain government did not publicly back down on the SENs until 17 December, the only real weapon it now had left was the ACTU. With the IRC opening up a loophole for ACTU intervention, the government was able to manoeuvre itself out of its dead-end position. After lengthy discussions, the RANF and ACTU finally agreed on a joint case to be put to the Commission on 15 December. The RANF had made some concessions, but the ACTU had agreed to all its major claims. Or at least, that’s what they told the union. But when presenting the case, the ACTU’s Jenny Acton started backtracking. When Irene Bolger tried to stop her, she accused the RANF of being ‘unable to understand the difference between substantial and total agreement’. But RANF members and their leadership understood the ACTU’s treachery only too well. Irene Bolger reported to that afternoon’s stopwork: ‘There is nothing joint about the proposal ¾ it is now just the ACTU proposal. I think we have been sold out.’ The nurses stayed out and the ACTU got the message, changing its position to one of total agreement with the RANF.
Two days before the strike ended, White publicly withdrew the threat to use SENs. The RANF sent its members back to the critical care wards. But still the government wouldn’t agree to the RANF/ACTU package. Irene Bolger held firm: ‘It’s not enough for an agreement in principle because we don’t trust him [David White] and our members don’t trust him. He needs to agree to the whole package.’ Finally on 19 December, White, on behalf of the Cain government, agreed to the ‘whole package’ and the nurses went back. A week later The Australian said of the nurses’ victory: Despite the problems, the nurses’ strike showed the power of solidarity at the rank and file level, not only among the strikers but in the working class as a whole. It showed how a predominantly female group of workers could sustain mass industrial action, and give a lead to other workers of both sexes. Like many other rebel women, their story offers an inspiring alternative to conventional women’s history.